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Information exchange and global
economic regulation—for whose
benefit?
Terry Dwyer
Since its 1998 report on harmful tax
competition, the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) has
been waging a diplomatic offensive to force
offshore financial centres (OFCs), often
described as tax havens, to remove ‘harmful’
tax practices. The OECD report and its lack
of theoretical economic reasoning have been
severely criticised.1 Partly in unacknowledged
response to such criticism, and due to a lack
of apparent enthusiasm in the United States
for a global tax cartel, the OECD now states
that it wants to promote tax competition. The
OECD’s notion of tax competition is not
unfettered fiscal competition between nation
states but its own definition of fair tax
competition based on its own particular and
parochial sensibilities. As the self-appointed
fiscal headmaster for the world, the OECD
insists that tax competition cannot be fair
without information disclosure on request
across national borders.
Now, in the wake of the September 11
terrorist attacks in the United States, new
laws are being adopted against the financing
of terrorism (including worldwide tracing
and seizure of funds) with far-reaching
ramifications for tax information disclosure
regimes worldwide, making it far more likely
that the OECD’s demands will be
implemented. International cooperation
against criminal activity is entirely
Offshore financial centres have both the sovereign right
and the moral right to insist that information exchange be
limited to matters of common criminality and governed by
due legal process for the protection of both their own
residents and citizens and their own economic interests.
There is nothing wrong, immoral or unnatural about
sovereign countries competing for investment by offering
differing legal and economic regulatory systems.
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warranted, but such cooperation and
information sharing also serves as a
precedent for international tax information
disclosure. This article examines the
problems arising when one country agrees
to act as tax collector for others. It is suggested
that the traditional rule of international law
enforcement cooperation requiring dual
criminality is a logical one and that
international cooperation on terrorism is not,
and should not be, the precedent for tax
information exchange on the lines desired
by the OECD.
This paper does not suggest that tax
avoidance or evasion are desirable per se.
Rather, it argues that many other features of
modern life which are also undesirable or
detrimental have not received equal attention.
The great trouble with the increasingly
strident attacks is that all too often it is
accepted that there is only one view of what
is moral. Users of OFCs and those countries
whose OFCs provide employment and
income are not to be condemned as immoral
merely because they seek or offer some kind
of economic freedom or financial privacy. In
this regard, OECD appeals to morality can
mask a ruthless pursuit of perceived
economic self-interest.
What does the OECD want?
The OECD wants OFCs to amend their
domestic laws so that records are created and
maintained of beneficial ownership or control
of OFC companies or trusts (transparency).
It also wants tax collectors in OECD countries
to be able to obtain information on demand
from citizens or residents of those countries
(exchange of information). Such changes in
the laws of OFCs would assist OECD
countries in enforcing civil and criminal tax
liabilities against OECD residents who may
have assets in tax havens.
The reason the OECD wants to force
OFCs to impose such obligations on their
own citizens and residents is that OECD
countries have difficulty enforcing taxes on
OECD residents in relation to income earned
by offshore entities. While it is relatively easy
to tax dividends or interest received from
overseas, it is more difficult to tax income
which remains offshore in foreign companies
or trusts. For that reason, many OECD
countries have adopted deeming provisions
in their tax laws which treat the income of
certain foreign companies or trusts as the
income of OECD residents who may be
shareholders or beneficiaries in such
companies or trusts. These deeming
provisions are often presented as being a
necessary part of residence-based income tax
systems under which a country taxes its
residents on both their domestic and foreign
source income.
Three points need to be stressed. First,
there is nothing canonical or sacred about a
residence-based income tax. Many countries
have operated territorial income tax systems
under which the problem of chasing income
in tax havens does not arise. Second, the
deeming provisions used to back up
residence-based taxation often involve legal
fictions under which OECD resident
taxpayers are expected to pay tax on income
which is not legally theirs and which may
never be theirs. Third, these deeming
provisions are conceded by the OECD itself
to be hostile domestic countermeasures
against tax havens.2
How does the OECD justify its
demands?
On the face of it, it is a remarkable thing that
an unelected international secretariat of
OECD bureaucrats should be seeking to
dictate to sovereign countries the duties and
obligations to be imposed on their citizens
and residents, even to the extent of overriding
domestic constitutional or other legal
protections for citizens’ privacy.
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Naturally, such a demand cannot be
made except from some high moral ground.
The OECD appears to base its moral stance
on the apparently simple proposition that
every country has a duty to refrain from
encouraging the residents of other countries
to seek escape from tax burdens.
It should be noted immediately that the
source of such a duty is not obvious in either
ethics or international law. So far as ethics is
concerned, to argue for such a duty requires
implicit acceptance that the tax laws of other
countries are always ethical or just (or at least,
the tax laws of OECD countries are uniformly
ethical or just). Taxation laws normally
demonstrate the arbitrary nature of positive
law or regulation, rather than any immutable
moral or ethical verities. If taxpayers choose
to flee their own tax systems, why should a
foreigner decide on the morality of their
actions? To suggest that other countries have
a duty to prevent capital flight from a foreign
jurisdiction is extremely presumptuous.
Money, like water, flows according to natural
laws and perhaps OECD countries
complaining of losing it should look to
whether their own positive taxation laws are
opposed to natural economic laws.
So far as international law is concerned,
the collection of taxes or tribute is a sovereign
act. Historically, only vassal or subordinate
polities have collected taxes for a superior
power. Sovereign countries do not collect
other countries’ taxes. The general
proposition that a foreign tax claim cannot
be enforced directly or indirectly (for
example, through collateral insolvency
proceedings), is well established, certainly
as far as the United Kingdom is concerned,
by a number of cases over many years (see
Morris 1980). The enforcement of a claim for
taxes is but an extension of the sovereign
power which imposed the taxes and an
assertion of sovereign authority by one state
within the territory of another is (treaty or
convention apart) contrary to all concepts of
independent sovereignties.
Economic background
Industrial economies levy high income taxes
in order to pay for high spending on age
pensions and welfare recipients. But income
taxes on capital income are hard to enforce if
capital can flee across borders. Labour income
taxes are already high and revenues from this
source will shrink as populations age and
people retire from the workforce.
From the conventional OECD point of
view, OFCs (or ‘tax havens’) help OECD
taxpayers avoid taxes on capital income
which rightly belongs to the OECD home
country. However, the logic of this OECD
economic argument does not stand up
(Dwyer 2000). The OECD has failed to engage
in real debate on the substantive issues or to
answer questions such as
• what is the logical basis for presuming
the superior neutrality of OECD
residence country income taxation over
the rights of source countries when fiscal
systems and public expenditure benefits
are not identical?
• why should ‘residence’ taxation extend
in any case to imposing OECD income
taxes on the incomes of (non-OECD
resident) companies or trusts in other
countries, through deemed attribution to
OECD residents who may have no rights
to such income?
• why does the OECD not consider
recommending territorial taxes on
immobile factors to its members as a form
of self-help against so-called ‘harmful tax
competition’?
• if OECD countries are concerned that
multinational corporate groups may re-
locate head offices or regional
headquarters to OFCs as e-commerce
develops, why is that something which
OFCs should be expected to discourage?
• why does the OECD not recommend
expenditure restraint to its members as a
solution to high and uncompetitive tax
regimes?
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• why does the OECD not recommend to
European countries that relaxation of
immigration restrictions against citizens
of developing counties might help them
replenish their diminishing labour tax
bases?
• is it not natural that capital would seek
to emigrate from countries which impose
high taxes, stop their populations from
growing and reject immigrants, thereby
limiting the scope for profitable
employment of capital?
• why should a sovereign country be
expected to curtail the rights of its own
citizens or impose demands on them (for
example, through breaching confident-
iality or imposing unnecessary record
keeping or audit requirements) for the
benefit of another country’s tax
collectors?
No country has to tax capital income. Land,
unlike capital, is an immobile tax base. In
economic theory, there are only three things
you can tax—land, labour or capital—and
only one of them cannot flee (or stop
regenerating).
As for declining labour income tax bases,
if residents of OECD countries are having
fewer children but those countries refuse to
allow increased immigration, then who is
responsible for shrinking labour tax bases?
It is arguable then, that the OECD has only
itself to blame if OECD countries attempt to
tax a mobile tax base like capital income
instead of an immobile one like land. If OECD
countries choose to tax business profits and
workers so heavily instead of landholders,
they must accept the natural economic
consequences of capital flight and falling
birthrates.
From a moral point of view, it might also
be seen as questionable for wealthy OECD
countries to demand that small developing
countries help them collect taxes (on income
belonging to OFC entities) while refusing to
let those small countries export labour to
OECD countries experiencing labour
shortages. More than one economist has
noted the paradox of moves towards free
trade in goods and services and free
movement of investment capital coinciding
with increased restrictions on the mobility
of labour. In this regard, it is noteworthy that
the European Union did accept the need for
free mobility of labour as part of the
completion of the European common market,
while tax harmonisation and tax
cooperation have lingered behind. If the
European Union thinks free trade in services
and free movement of labour are of greater
importance than tax harmonisation or
cooperation, why are small developing
countries not entitled to share this view?
Given that self-determination is an
inherent aspect of national sovereignty, it is
worth examining the practical and logical
issues which confront a small country in
deciding whether or not to agree to cooperate
with the OECD demands on tax havens and,
if inclined to cooperate, what it should seek
in return. It is also worth examining the
emerging belief that offshore financial centre
privacy is a cloak for all sorts of illicit activities
through the misuse of offshore companies.
What is a reasonable quid pro quo
for information exchange?
The OECD’s demands on harmful tax
competition originally fell into three
groups—transparency, ringfencing and
exchange of information (all subsumed
under the idea of ‘fair ’ tax competition).
Demands for ringfencing have waned since
most OECD countries themselves could not
conform to that original requirement. The
OECD demand for ‘transparency’ requires
offshore centres to ensure that their domestic
laws are altered to require creation and
maintenance of records setting out the
beneficial ownership or control of trusts and
companies. In turn, these records will be
available to answer inquiries from OECD
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countries. Although the requirement of
transparency is generally thought of as
appropriate to making governments
accountable to their electors, the OECD
requirement will be imposed on the private
sector. It does not matter if neither the private
sector nor the government of an offshore
country see any need to create or maintain
such databases or wish to protect information
under data or privacy protection laws. With
regard to the ‘exchange’ of information, in
practice, information flow is likely to be
virtually one-way—from the tax haven to
OECD countries to allow them to tax their
residents on their overseas interests or
deemed interests.
The first thing to observe is that
agreements for exchange of information for
tax purposes are normally found only in full
double taxation agreements. The starting
point for an offshore financial centre in
dealing with an OECD country should
therefore be that exchange of information for
tax purposes be considered solely in the
context of a full double taxation agreement.
An OFC agreeing to exchange of information
might expect the full benefits of a double tax
treaty. Such benefits might include
• reduced withholding taxes on dividends
and interest flowing from an OECD
country to the OFC
• a business profits exclusion rule to
ensure that investors from the OFC in the
OECD country who did not have a
permanent establishment in the OECD
country would not be subject to tax in
the OECD country
• concessional or zero capital gains
taxation on disposal of assets in the
OECD country by investors from the OFC.
There are also other issues relevant to OFCs
in any information exchange with an OECD
country, including immunities for its public
officials or residents, revenue sharing, user
pays (that is, treaty partners) funding of
information gathering and abolition of
existing OECD countermeasures.
Further, exchange of information articles
in full double taxation agreements are
generally subordinated to the local
legislation of each country. The most widely
used OECD model convention excludes the
exchange of information where the recipient
of the information request would use it to
carry out administrative measures at
variance with the laws or the administrative
practice of either state, or if the information
is not obtainable under the information
collecting powers of the recipient state or
would disclose trade, business, industrial,
commercial or professional secret or trade
processes, or information the disclosure of
which would be contrary to public policy.
Thus, if a country has strict bank secrecy,
such as Switzerland or Singapore, its local
tax authority cannot provide more in
response to a request for information from a
treaty partner than it could obtain under local
practices. Similarly, given that the US
Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures, a treaty partner of the
United States cannot expect the US Internal
Revenue Service to provide information
which would require a search warrant
authorising activities outside the scope of US
law and its constitutional limitations.
If there are global tax norms (a proposition
which may be severely doubted), then the
OECD tax treaty system would be a logical
place to look. Although the OECD may reply
that it is revising its model treaty, there are
literally hundreds of treaties still in force
based on previous OECD and UN tax treaty
models. These treaties contain a very different
set of tax norms to those seeking unilateral
surrender of information. No country agrees
to force its citizens or residents to provide
information for another country unless there
is a significant benefit in doing so, a benefit
which justifies overriding protection of the
individual rights of owners of information,
including data protection and privacy rights.
The long history of negotiations on double
taxation agreements since the 1920s shows
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that most countries will only agree to
exchange of information for tax purposes if
they are assured of substantial concessions
as a quid pro quo from the treaty partner.
The jurisprudence of
international tax
The fundamental understanding in all
international tax negotiations is that taxation
is a sovereign act. Even within federations, it
has been recognised that no state has an
obligation to assist the revenue collectors of
another state.
It is always open to jurisdictions to agree
to enforce each others’ taxes, as has occurred
between Australian states. The salient point
remains that no jurisdiction has the slightest
duty to agree to anything that is not in its own
interests. This principle also applies to self-
governing colonies in the British tradition. As
Pitt the Elder noted in his speeches on the
American Revolution,3 it is a fundamental
principle of English law that the sovereign
has no right to put his hands into the people’s
pockets without their consent, and that
consent can only be given by a local
parliament agreeing to local tax laws.
Further considerations
On the question of benefits from a tax treaty, if
an OFC were to agree to a full double taxation
agreement with an OECD country it would
also need to seek some further concessions on
tax sparing. There is not much point in
offering tax incentives or being a tax-free
jurisdiction if those tax exemptions are wiped
out by other countries imposing taxes on the
exempted income. That is basically what
OECD residence taxation does. In this context,
it should be noted that at around the same
time as the OECD produced its report on
harmful tax competition (OECD 1998) it also
produced another report on tax sparing
(OECD 1999) recommending that OECD
countries rethink their willingness to forgo
taxation on income exempted from tax
through incentives in developing economies,
such as Malaysia and Singapore.
The OECD has recommended counter-
measures against OFCs not agreeing to
exchange of information.4 Many of those
countermeasures already exist. Accordingly,
an offshore financial centre being asked to
provide information for tax purposes to an
OECD country might well wish to demand
that the OECD country remove its existing
countermeasures, as well as agreeing to a full
double taxation agreement and tax sparing
recognition of the OFC’s tax incentives.
Among the most important counter-
measures already in existence are legislation
on controlled foreign companies, passive
investment funds and transferor trusts.
Essentially, this legislation seeks to bypass
the normal legal rules on residence or source
of income to tax OECD residents not on their
actual foreign income, but on income of
foreign entities which it deems under
domestic law to be the income of its residents.
Thus, income arising in an OFC to an OFC
company or trust may be taxed by an OECD
country even if no OECD resident has any
right to that income. Such legislation in
OECD countries has increasingly become the
norm but was originally highly controversial.
Switzerland took the view that it was
fundamentally contrary to a double taxation
agreement for one OECD country to seek to
tax income arising to a company or trust in
another country by attributing that income
to its own domestic taxpayers.
There is not only a large degree of
arbitrariness about the deeming processes in
these legislative countermeasures; from the
point of view of an OFC seeking to attract
investment capital, such provisions may be
viewed as a discriminatory OECD export tax
on capital. The logical question to ask is why
would a small offshore financial centre
cooperate in a double tax agreement with an
OECD country that is not only unwilling to
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remove tax barriers to the free flow of capital
but tries to impose them through the back
door? Why should any developing economy
be expected to assist OECD countries tax the
income of companies and trusts in that
country? Surely it is for each country to decide
whether or how to tax entities or relationships
established under its laws? If an OFC wants
to encourage local economic growth through
exempting its financial services sector, why
should it be expected to wipe out those
incentives for the benefit of OECD countries
richer than itself?
What if a full double taxation
agreement is not possible?
The OECD demand for information
exchange has thus far been discussed in the
context of double taxation agreements.
However, any treaty requires the agreement
of two parties. It is unlikely that an OECD
country would agree to a proposal for
information exchange for tax purposes with
an offshore financial centre on the basis
outlined above, involving a full double
taxation agreement, tax sparing, and
withdrawal of countermeasures. To do so
would be to acknowledge the legitimacy of
the right of OFCs to compete for investment
capital with full recognition of their
sovereign right not to impose taxes.
An apparent unwillingness to accord
such recognition of fiscal sovereignty to OFCs
seems to be why the OECD has not pursued
information exchange for tax purposes in the
normal context of full double taxation
agreements with OFCs. Instead, the OECD
has increasingly shifted its lines of argument
from ‘harmful tax competition’ (a debate
which was not sustainable) to a focus on
information exchange for law enforcement
purposes. Having failed to gain consensus
on the alleged evils of ‘harmful’ tax
competition, the OECD has refocused its aim
on the evils of tax avoidance and evasion
(which the OECD apparently regards as
indistinguishable) and has urged
multilateral support for measures to enforce
unilateral information exchange from OFCs.
The argument put is essentially simple:
without worldwide information gathering,
tax systems which tax worldwide income of
residents cannot be enforced. This is part of
the so-called ‘dark side’ of globalisation—
the increased ability of OECD taxpayers to
minimise their tax obligations. Therefore, to
stop capital flight from high tax countries
and to ensure ‘equity’, low tax OFCs should
provide information to OECD countries on
request to allow OECD countries to check up
on their taxpayers.
Civil versus criminal law
cooperation
At first blush, such cooperation against
alleged ‘economic criminals’ may appear
reasonable. Nations have traditionally
cooperated on matters of common criminality.
The basic rule of international law is that one
jurisdiction may help another in a criminal
matter where the alleged offence is criminal
under both systems of law (the rule on dual or
common criminality). The OECD, however,
views the present rule on common criminality
as too narrow and urges that, as a matter of
comity between nations in a globalising
world, it is now necessary for OFCs to agree
to information exchange for both civil and
criminal law enforcement purposes, including
both criminal and civil tax matters.
Tax evasion and avoidance in
relation to the rule on common
criminality
Such a position represents a drastic
expansion of de facto extra-territorial law
enforcement beyond the borders of OECD
countries, but the traditional rule on common
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criminality makes logical sense and ought
not be set aside. Essentially, the rule on
common criminality as a precondition for
mutual legal assistance or information
exchange recognises that each sovereign
country is master in its own house. No
country exists to enforce the laws of another
country; if any country enacts tax laws which
need extra-territorial enforcement, that is its
own problem: no one is preventing that
country being more sensible and only taxing
economic activity arising within its borders.
It seems that the OECD is trying to
undermine this fundamental international
law objection to information disclosure
based on the prerequisite of common
criminality. The argument is put that
information disclosure from OFCs upon
request by OECD countries is necessary for
them to prevent tax evasion according to their
own laws. The reasoning is that tax evasion
is fraud, fraud is criminal under most legal
systems and therefore information exchange
for tax purposes is justified on the basis that
fraud is criminal everywhere. This sort of
argument has had some success but it still
seems fundamentally inconsistent with the
traditional rule that countries do not enforce
each other’s tax laws.5
The question remains: why should
anyone be obliged to help high-taxing OECD
countries stop capital flowing to where taxes
are lower? The capital flowing away belongs
to their citizens, not to OECD governments,
and other countries do no injury to anyone’s
rights if they make such capital welcome.
The assertion that OFCs should provide
information for tax purposes to OECD
countries raises some further questions,
namely,
• why should legal assistance not be
limited by the traditional rule on dual
criminality?
• given that national revenue laws all
differ so much, if a developing economy
were to assist in the application of other
country’s revenue laws in respect of acts
committed in its territory, what
immunities would its companies,
citizens or residents have from
prosecution by other countries on
pretended charges of complicity in
alleged revenue fraud, even though what
was done in the developing economy
was perfectly legal under its laws? Will
assisting the extra-territorial application
of OECD criminal revenue laws mean
that citizens or residents of developing
countries could be charged under other
countries’ laws for acts which were legal
when and where they were done? Are
OECD countries committed to respecting
the operation of developing countries’
laws relating to the legality of acts
committed in those countries?
• given that both the UN and OECD model
tax conventions recognise the legitimacy
of source country taxation and territorial
tax systems, what basis is there in
international law for European OECD
countries (many of which have
employed territorial systems) to expect
developing countries to give priority to
residence countries’ tax claims by
agreeing to the criminalisation of the use
of territorial tax systems by OECD
investors offshore?
• what burdens or obligations to create,
produce papers or give evidence would
be imposed upon companies, citizens or
residents, were the country to agree to
OECD demands for information
exchange? Why should new obligations
to create records for the benefit of a
foreign state be enacted by any country?
• where a country has a constitutionally-
entrenched right to privacy of personal
papers, as in Article IV of the Bill of Rights
of the United States of America, why
should foreign tax collectors expect that
country to force its citizens or residents
to supply information without any legal
process for issuing and testing warrants
through judicial due process?
• if a country were to agree to assist in the
enforcement of other countries’ revenue
laws, what share of those countries’
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revenues would be paid to that
developing country? If none, why should
any sovereign country be expected to
disregard its own interests so
completely?
• do all OECD countries distinguish
between tax evasion and tax avoidance,
and do they all recognise the lawful right
of free citizens to dispose of their
property as they think fit? If not, do they
expect other countries with a more
refined sense of the rule of law to assist
them treat as criminal offences matters
which are merely the exercise of rights to
dispose of property?
• if tax evasion is treated as a criminal
rather than a civil matter in some OECD
countries, are taxpayers in those
countries given the normal criminal
protections such as the onus of proof
lying on the prosecution and the right
not to be forced to incriminate oneself? If
they are not, why should such an OECD
country expect another country to lower
its normal protections for an accused in
relation to acts which are in any case
lawful in that other country?
In any event, tax planning or tax avoidance
is not fraud (no matter how unappreciated
by revenue officials). Tax administrators are,
however, often not inclined to distinguish
between tax evasion and tax avoidance.
Increasingly, revenue authorities in OECD
countries tend to take the view that any
attempt at aggressive tax planning is
essentially tax evasion and may be
prosecuted as a criminal activity.
Interestingly, tax evasion has not always
been dealt with as a form of fraud in law. Tax
evasion was not dealt with normally as a
criminal matter in many countries precisely
because taxpayers were expected to supply
voluntarily the information which would
expose them to financial liabilities. For
example, in Australia before 1980, the normal
practice on matters of tax evasion was—and
generally still is—to impose penalty tax
administratively without any court case to
prove criminal fraud.
If tax evasion were treated as a normal
criminal matter, taxpayers could justify their
refusal to answer tax return questions, or to
allow access to documents on request on the
basis that such demands violate the normal
rule against self-incrimination (which
incidentally does apply to pecuniary
penalties such as taxes). The routine
administration of taxes would become
impossible if a large number of taxpayers
were treated as potential criminals who in
turn demanded their rights to the normal
protections for the accused under criminal
law. In order to avoid such procedural
paralysis, the compromise developed that tax
authorities were given enormous
inquisitorial powers (far greater than any
powers given to police) to investigate
taxpayers affairs without search warrants or
other legal protections on the corresponding
understanding that taxpayers would not be
treated as criminals and that any tax
deficiency would be recovered through
administrative penalties as a debt.
Another quid pro quo was that taxpayers
were often assured by statutory guarantees
that their personal financial affairs would
be kept secret and not disclosed to other
authorities such as the police. For example,
a prostitute could file a tax return disclosing
the source of her earnings without risking
prosecution.
In recent years, however, such balances
of public policy interests have been eroded
in OECD countries. OECD taxpayers can
often face both civil and criminal proceedings
for the same default without the normal
protections owed to the suspect or the
accused in the criminal law. It is precisely
because of the uneasy overlap between civil
and criminal categories, and the often blurred
distinction in administrative and judicial
practice between avoidance and evasion in
tax matters, that it is technically dubious to
assert broadly that tax defaults are all simply
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a form of fraud covered by the international
law rules on mutual assistance in matters of
common criminality. Such doubts explain
why countries have usually declined to
enforce, or assist in the enforcement of, other
countries’ taxes in any way.
Thus, there is still compelling logic in
favour of the traditional treatment of taxes
as pecuniary penalties imposed by a
sovereign and with which another sovereign
need not concern himself. Whether civil or
criminal, taxes still represent pecuniary
penalties rather than normal commercial
debts, and it is not the job of one sovereign to
collect them for another.
Privacy and human rights—
security of capital
From the point of view of an offshore financial
centre seeking to attract capital, other serious
questions are raised by demands for
information disclosure for other countries’
law enforcement purposes. Increasingly,
arguments are being made that corporate
vehicles are being used for illicit purposes
besides tax evasion or avoidance, such as
corporate law manipulations, insider trading,
exchange control avoidance, hiding assets
from creditors or spouses, as well as avoidance
of forced heirship rules.6 Whether one regards
such purposes as legitimate or illicit (which
arguably depends upon the circumstances of
each case), the argument is made that
disclosure of information (for example,
beneficial ownership) is necessary if OECD
countries are to prevent avoidance of their
laws through the use of offshore vehicles.
A country can only develop and attract
capital investment if it can offer secure
property rights. That means what it says:
private property is private, not transparent.
You cannot have private property without
privacy. You cannot attract private
investment if its details are to be made public
to every inquisitive foreign bureaucrat.7
The recognition that privacy and private
property go together is why many countries,
including the United States, have constitut-
ional provisions protecting private citizens
from arbitrary searches and seizures, and laws
impairing the performance of contracts,
guaranteeing privacy and preventing unjust
taking of private property.
A country will not experience economic
development if local and overseas investors
fear the disturbance of their commercial
affairs or the taking of their property by
government officials. Governments exist to
protect people’s rights and to protect them
in their life, limb and property. Once
governments cease to do so and are perceived
to prey upon private commercial interests,
merchants and others seek to take their
wealth elsewhere. Concrete examples of
capital flight in these circumstances are sadly
too numerous to catalogue here.
Any form of information disclosure
concerning the affairs of a private citizen is
inherently a diminution of rights of private
property. For example, it has always been part
of the common law duty of bankers to keep
their customers’ affairs confidential. There are
very good reasons for that, including the
obvious risk of damage to a customer’s credit.
It may therefore be seen as somewhat peculiar
that the OECD has supported the growth of
market capitalism throughout the world, yet,
through demands for information disclosure,
is now undermining the security of private
property upon which nations depend for their
prosperity. At the same time, OECD
governments are loudly proclaiming Data
Protection and Privacy Acts while busily
seeking to allow their officials increased
powers to invade the privacy they purport to
protect. Against this background, it must be
remembered that privacy is both a human
right and a property right. If information is to
be sought within a country’s borders, the
citizens of that country may well insist that
it should only be available under very strict
safeguards.
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Modern economists and business people
often take the legal foundations of a free
society and a free market economy for
granted. But the declaration of the rights of
individuals evolved as concrete response to
abuse of state power. It is noteworthy that
Adam Smith bases his first objection to taxing
capital8 on the intolerable vexation an
inquisition into every man’s affairs would
involve. The sentiment of common law
jurisprudence in England has always been
that the subject is free and that the common
law exists to protect his property and his
privacy, the paramountcy of the liberty of the
subject as against the power of the state.
Continental legal systems by contrast have
traditionally typified the relationship of the
state and the subject as one of subordination
of the liberty of the governed to the
requirements of the state.
Among the common law rights of the
people which have been protected over the
centuries are
1. the right to trial by jury
2. the presumption of innocence
3. the right not to be forced to incriminate
oneself
4. the right not to be arrested or invaded in
one’s privacy other than by judicially-
supervised warrants based on cause
5. the right not to be deprived of life, liberty
or property other than in accordance
with due process of law
6. the right to ensure confidential commun-
ications with spouses or lawyers are not
used as evidence against oneself.
Thus, it is hardly surprising that Article IV
of the Bill of Rights to the United States
Constitution entrenches the common law.
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
Article V goes on to protect the right not to be
forced to incriminate oneself and to protect
life, liberty and property against unlawful
deprivation.9
It is contrary to sovereignty to expect the
citizens of country A to do anything to help
country B collect taxes from country B’s
citizens or residents—all the more so if to do
so would involve country A violating the civil
rights of its own citizens. Accordingly, any
self-governing jurisdiction would be entitled
to insist that due legal process and judicial
supervision be required for any information
disclosure to a foreign country. These might
include safeguards against abuse such as the
following.
Information may only be disclosed
pursuant to a local search warrant issued by
a Judge upon probable cause supported by a
sworn statement and that damages will be
payable if that sworn statement cannot be
supported or represents an abuse of process.
• Information may only be disclosed
where it may be relevant to an offence
against that country’s laws not any other
country’s laws.
• Spouses and family members should not
be compelled to give evidence against
each other.
• Information sought and obtained for one
purpose should not be abused by being
used for another and should not be
admissible in any other proceedings
against any person other than the person
in respect of whom it was requested.
To take a hypothetical example from current
circumstances, the vast majority of humanity
would be happy to provide voluntarily any
information they could to ensure that such
things as the World Trade Center attacks
never happen again. But, a US resident who
happily assisted the FBI trace through an
overseas bank account might be more than
upset if that information was subsequently
turned over to the US Internal Revenue
Service and used to convict him for non-
disclosure of a foreign bank account for tax
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purposes. In a similar way, OFCs and their
business sectors have shown themselves
willing to cooperate against common
criminality, but that does not mean they are
willing to see their investors scared away by
implied threats that their private financial
affairs will be disclosed upon request to any
OECD tax collector or regulatory authority.10
If OFCs wish to attract or retain private
client business, it is therefore essential that
there be very strong safeguards on any
process of exchange of information from
OFCs to the OECD or other countries.
Information on private client affairs should
only be supplied to other countries where
genuinely required for investigation of
common criminality and subject to the normal
legal rules on warrants, immunities,
admissibility, and so forth.
‘Misuse’ of corporate vehicles for
illicit purposes?
While it is possible to imagine offshore
corporate vehicles being misused for illicit
purposes, it does not follow that every
attempt to secure offshore financial privacy
is illegitimate. It is illogical for the OECD to
imply that any legal system which offers
secrecy or confidentiality is therefore ipso facto
suspect or that offshore governments should
insist that records of beneficial ownership of
companies be available for OECD tax or other
investigators in cases outside the scope of
common criminality.
Most legal systems, including those of
OECD countries, protect privacy and require
secrets and confidences to be kept—for
example, German, Austrian or Swiss bank
secrecy. The English law of wills recognises
the ability of testators to create secret or semi-
secret trusts for the benefit of others such as
illegitimate children or mistresses. Breaches
of confidence can be stopped by injunctions
in equity. Nor do trustee owners of company
shares have to disclose beneficial ownership
except in certain circumstances. Partnerships
can be silent, both in England and in Europe.
All commerce is about competition.
Competition means ensuring that competitors
do not gain an insight into your strengths or
weaknesses. Competition requires confident-
iality regarding any number of business
activities, from cost of manufacture and
pricing, customer and supplier lists and
contracts to the development of intellectual
property. Secrecy can help a company keep
its markets and avoid boycotts. For example,
British firms dealing simultaneously with
both South Africa and other African countries
or both Israel and Arab states seem to have
put considerable commercial value on
secrecy.
Although many uses of OFCs involve
attempts to secure privacy in order to get
around various forms of economic or social
regulation in the country of the investor, it
does not necessarily follow that attempts by
an investor’s home country to enforce its
economic or social regulations through
information disclosure should be accorded
the same respect as requests for assistance
in normal law enforcement.
Investors may use offshore financial
vehicles and financial privacy for tax
planning which, as noted above, does not
necessarily mean tax evasion. An investor
engaging in perfectly legal tax planning may
seek financial privacy because he does not
want to risk the disruption and expense of
onshore litigation to prove the correctness of
his position. Furthermore, there is nothing
morally or legally wrong with trying to keep
secret one’s successful commercial or legal
strategies.
To take another example, investors may
use offshore financial vehicles for insider
trading. Insider trading has an interesting
history. Until recently, it was not a criminal
offence in the European Union. Legal
academics and economists still disagree as
to how insider trading should be defined and
how broad the scope of the offence should
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be. At one end of the academic spectrum is
the argument that insider trading should
never be an offence since it hastens the
dissemination of price sensitive information
in the market. Arguably, given the fiduciary
duties of directors, it may be wrong for a
company director in possession of company
information to trade in their shares (as a
shareholder, one may certainly think so). But,
is it wrong for a mere passer-by who
overhears an interesting conversation and
subsequently buys shares on the basis of what
was heard? These are contentious issues and
the most appropriate approach to take
regarding such economic regulation is not
immediately obvious. Thus, a country may
agree that some forms of insider trading are
within the rule on common criminality but
refuse to accept another country’s view that
all insider trading constitutes an offence.
Another case is where offshore financial
vehicles involve exchange control planning.
Again, why should a country with no
exchange controls be expected to disclose
information so that another country can
enforce its repressive financial regulation?
As mentioned above, offshore structures
are commonly used for asset protection from
creditors, spouses or forced heirship rules.
Again, is it necessarily wrong for a prudent
businessman to wish to protect assets from
such claims? Similar considerations arise
where we are talking about use of domestic
companies or trusts to evade marital
community property laws or forced heirship.
The morality of such asset protection must
depend entirely on individual circumstances.
No one can generalise that all attempts to
use offshore vehicles to avoid or evade
lawsuits, marital property regimes, forced
heirship, divorce courts or testator’s family
maintenance orders are morally wrong.
There is nothing inherently wrong in
countries competing to provide investors
with a choice between differing legal systems.
It is reasonable to assume that most people
in most countries are generally happy with
their legal systems and that those legal
systems represent, even if only indirectly, the
views of a majority of citizens. If this were
not the case, those systems would not be what
they are. However, a significant number of
people residing in a particular country may
not find the local laws to their liking. For
example, an English businessman living in
France may not like the French marital
community property system or the French
commercial code. He may therefore wish to
avoid both by using Jersey trusts and
companies to hold assets and run his
international business interests. Ultimately,
an individual’s ability to choose the laws of
one jurisdiction rather than another involves
considerations of individual freedom as well
as national sovereignty. If a significant
number of individuals or entities choose an
offshore jurisdiction, the home country may
well have reason to revisit its own taxation
policies as part of a self-critical examination
in the light of tax competition, rather than
attack offshore jurisdictions.
The very real risk for an OFC is that if it
agrees to unrestrained information
disclosure on the financial affairs of its
private client investors to their home
countries for all sorts of civil law, tax or other
economic regulatory purposes it will very
soon be out of business. It will be throwing
away the advantages of engaging in
international commerce (which the Internet
is now providing). It will be throwing away
its sovereign right to seek prosperity by
providing people from other countries with
different choices of legal regime to govern
their assets and business affairs.
Paradoxically, there is also a risk for OECD
countries that, if OFCs are shut down, the
incentive arising from international taxation
competition, when seen as a practical driver
for the creation of better, more economically
efficient taxation systems, will cease to exist,
further harming domestic growth and
prosperity for all nations concerned, not just
the small developing economies.
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Information exchange treaty
protections
Because civil rights and due process, as well
as economic prosperity, may depend so much
on how information exchange is handled by
OFCs in the future, it is worth summarising
what would be useful provisions to have in
relation to a treaty for information exchange
with foreign governments. It is assumed that
any information exchange has to be
predicated on a legal assistance framework
which respects the rule on common
criminality and which acknowledges that
fiscal matters are outside the scope of
common criminality.
First, a request for information might
need to be supported by sworn statements
which could be tested before a local judge.
From the point of view of protecting human
rights and rights of private property, local
citizens are likely to find it totally
unacceptable if their legal and constitutional
rights can be swept aside merely by the action
of a foreign official. Arbitrary searches and
seizures are unlikely to be attractive to foreign
investors.
Second, one might expect there to be
immunities for use and derivative use of
information supplied. For example, if a
foreign government seeks information
relating to drug trafficking by person X, it
should not be able to use that information to
prosecute person Y for an unrelated offence.
Such immunities would be required both for
foreigners and local residents. No country
can be expected to force its citizens to disclose
information to a foreign country when such
disclosure would expose its citizens or
public officials to arrest when visiting that
foreign country.
The crucial point is that information
disclosure under any treaty has to be seen as
thoroughly governed by legal due process.
Legitimate investors in OFCs should not be
worried by information exchange on matters
of common criminality, but they will be
entitled to worry if information exchange
amounts to unilateral disclosure for the
purposes of their home country’s economic
or fiscal regulatory purposes. The truth of
the matter is that governments themselves
compete for investment and compete in terms
of offering different legal and fiscal systems.
The United States and United Kingdom are
well-known tax havens for foreign investors
and they have richly profited from being so.
Investors often place their monies in or
through OFCs precisely because they want
to take advantage of tax and regulatory
competition. Such economic competition not
only benefits the OFCs themselves but the
broader world economy. It is therefore
unrealistic for OECD countries to expect other
countries to agree to information disclosure
on such lax terms that the investment
attractiveness of those non-OECD countries
is destroyed.
Notes
1 See for example, Gaffney (1999), Dwyer
(2000), Dwyer and Dwyer (2001). There has
been considerable criticism of the OECD by
members of the US Congress, and the Centre
for Freedom and Prosperity in Washington
has usefully assembled a great deal of such
criticism on its website,
www.freedomandprosperity.org. The
Commonwealth Secretariat in London has
also defended the rights of small
Commonwealth countries to formulate their
own tax policies.
2 Given this OECD admission, one might have
thought that an OFC agreeing to cooperate
with the OECD’s demands would be
rewarded with removal of the
countermeasures, but removal of existing
countermeasures is not offered by the OECD.
3 William Pitt, ‘Taxation is no part of the
governing or legislative power. The taxes are
a voluntary gift or grant of the Commons
alone...The distinction between legislation
and taxation is essentially necessary to
liberty.’(14 January 1766) ‘The spirit of
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resistance to your arbitrary system of
taxation might have been foreseen; it was
obvious from the nature of things, and of
mankind...The spirit which now resists your
taxation in America is the same which
formerly opposed loans, benevolences and
ship-money in England; the same spirit which
called all of England on its legs, and by the
Bill of Rights vindicated the English
Constitution; the same spirit which
established the great fundamental, essential
maxim of your liberties—that no subject shall
be taxed but by his own consent’ (20 January
1775), reprinted in MacArthur, (1996:71, 79).
4 Also called ‘defensive measures’. This
language of economic warfare smacks of
neo- mercantilism. Incidentally, one wonders
why any country subjected to
countermeasures, such as interference with
its normal commercial banking, would have
any incentive to cooperate much with OECD
countries on far more important matters
(such as fighting drug trafficking or
terrorism). The OECD threats of sanctions
for merely pursuing one’s sovereign tax
policies could end up undermining the willing
cooperation against serious crime which
currently exists.
5 The House of Lords reversed the Court of
Appeal in In re State of Norway (No.1), (H.L.
Feb. 16, 1989), holding that simply providing
evidence to another state for that state to
use to enforce its revenue laws does not
constitute the direct or indirect enforcement
of another state’s revenue laws. The decision
highlights new possibilities of information
disclosure to foreign revenue authorities
from common law countries in civil and
criminal tax cases, especially between
governmental authorities. The correctness
of the decision, however, seems open to
doubt as being inconsistent with the
previous authority and it is not binding
outside the United Kingdom. Jeffery
(1999:117–19) argues that mutual tax law
enforcement strengthens each country’s
sovereignty over its own citizens but he does
not address arguments such as those
presented here or in Dwyer (2000). His thesis
seems to assume a world of like countries
with like views.
6 See OECD (2001) for an interesting essay on
misuses of corporate vehicles, though one
might note that many of the practices it
criticises occur under laws imported from
OECD countries in their former role as
colonial powers. One also notes that
corporate collapses and scandals in OECD
countries are hardly a thing of the past.
7 The OECD does not seem to recognise the
underlying logical contradiction between
supporting market economies and private
property on the one hand while pushing with
the other for ‘transparency’ to invade
investors’ privacy.
8 Smith wisely anticipated the legal and
economic consequences of the OECD tax
agenda, noting that
…the quantity and value of the land
which any man possesses can never be
a secret, and can always be ascertained
with great exactness. But the whole
amount of the capital stock which he
possesses is almost always a secret, and
can scarce ever be ascertained with
tolerable exactness. It is liable, besides,
to almost continual variations...
Secondly, land is a subject which cannot
be removed; whereas stock easily may.
The proprietor of land is necessarily a
citizen of the particular country in which
his estate lies. The proprietor of stock is
properly a citizen of the world, and is
not necessarily attached to any
particular country. He would be apt to
abandon the country in which he was
exposed to a vexatious inquisition, in
order to be assessed to a burdensome
tax, and would remove his stock to
some other country where he could
either carry on his business, or enjoy
his fortune more at his ease. By
removing his stock he would put an end
to all the industry which it had
maintained in the country which he left.
Stock cultivates land; stock employs
labour. A tax which tended to drive
away stock from any particular country
would so far tend to dry up every source
of revenue both to the sovereign and
to the society. Not only the profits of
stock, but the rent of land and the wages
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of labour would necessarily be more or
less diminished by its removal
(1776:848–49).
9 ‘No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just
compensation’.
1 0 It is notable that no evidence seems to have
emerged to date of any terrorist financing
being undertaken through offshore centres
(all of which have been willing to cooperate
with US law enforcement agencies). This may
not be so surprising; offshore centres are
often small and more closely regulated than
large financial centres.
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